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1.
The Emperor Has No Clothes is derived from Hans Christian Andersen's "The
Emperor's New Clothes." HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (Naomi
Lewis trans., Candlewick Press 1997) (1837). The story involves an emperor who "loved [his] fine
clothes more than anything else in the world." Id. at 1. Two suspicious characters arrived in the
emperor's city and, presenting themselves as weavers, claimed that the cloth they used bore
magical properties. Id. at 2. According to these weavers, the cloth was invisible to unintelligent
people and to people unfit for their jobs. Id. The emperor, recognizing an opportunity to see
whether his people were fit for their positions, hired the weavers to make him a new set of
clothes. Id. As one may predict, no one could see the clothes when they were finished. Id. at 5.
The emperor, his closest aides, and the people, however, all pretended to see these "charming"
garments for fear of being labelled unintelligent or unfit for their jobs. Id. At the story's climax,
as the emperor walks through town in his new clothes, a child mutters that the emperor has no
clothes. Id. at 13. Soon, everyone else murmurs that he has no clothes and the emperor wondered
if they were right, as he was afraid to admit that he could not see the clothes himself. Id. at 14.
The emperor said to himself, "If I stop, it will spoil the procession. And that would never do." Id.
As a result, prouder than ever, he walked on through the town, ignorant of his folly. Id.
Likewise, U.S. privacy advocates see the EU Directive 95/46 as a new set of clothes, so to
speak, for the rights of consumers in the U.S. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
[hereinafter Directive]. These advocates, along with the Directive's weavers, view this as the
pinnacle of data protection and believe that it represents the high-water mark of a privacy
friendly world where consumers are "respected" on-line. Many U.S. privacy advocates push for a
similar system in the U.S.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Internet users in the United States and the European Union
("EU") often debate the state of international data privacy, while
scholars and companies also present questions to the Internet
community regarding the regulation of data privacy and the amount of
regulation required in the U.S. Inquiries range from how to determine
the necessary degree of regulation and how to implement regulations
to how to enforce any regulations that the U.S. lawmakers 2 may pass.
Historically, the EU and the U.S. approach data 3 privacy regulations
in diametrically opposed ways. 4 While the EU relies primarily on

2.
Data privacy regulations can come from many different sources. See, e.g., infra Part
IV.B.3 (discussing Safe Harbor provisions promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC")). In addition, Congress can pass federal legislation (like the Directive), and states can
enact legislation. This Note discusses data privacy rules and regulations at a holistic level in the
U.S., regardless of what agency or lawmaking body proposes them.
3.
Data collected often include names, addresses, E-mail addresses, etc., which are used to
create consumer profiles to aid in marketing efforts.
4.
The EU promises strict enforcement of data "rights," while the U.S. has adopted a
laissez-faire approach. Compare Jennifer E. O'Brien et al., EuropeanPrivacyDirective: A Primer,
PA. BAR ASS'N Q., Apr. 2001, at 84 (noting the EU's strict, legislative approach to data
protection), with Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United
States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 357 (2000)
(discussing American Internet privacy: "You already have zero privacy, get over it") (quoting
Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun Microsystems). See generally James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A.
Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor: Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMM.
LAw CONSPECTUS 149-50 (2001) (describing the market-based approach). Glancy contends that
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legislation and heavy regulation, the U.S. has adopted a marketbased, self-regulatory approach to data privacy. 5 The EU further
distinguishes itself from the U.S. by implementing an approach that
guarantees its citizens protection of their "fundamental rights." 6 Such
protection allows for strict governmental control of information flow.
The U.S., on the other hand, does not recognize data privacy as a
fundamental right, employing instead a less prophylactic approach
7
than that taken by the EU.
Despite these ideological differences, the EU codified its
"fundamental right" principle in 1998 when it enacted Directive 95/46
(the "Directive"). With the Directive, the EU created a broad,
overarching piece of legislation that gives significant power to the
individual with regard to use of her personal information. First, it
purports to create uniformity in EU data practices by requiring
companies to inform consumers of what they plan to do with the
personal information which they collect from their websites.8 Second,
in so doing, the Directive requires the respective companies to secure
affirmative consent from consumers to collect, use, and disseminate

the U.S. utilizes self-regulation and that consumers do not have privacy rights in the sense that
Europeans define privacy. Glancy, supra,at 357.
5.
See Kenneth Mullen, Data Transfers: Navigating to a Safe Harbor, CYBERSPACE LAW.,
July/Aug. 2001, at 8 (noting that the EU takes an interventionist approach, while the U.S.
employs a self-regulation approach).
6.
Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 4, at 148-49 (discussing the concept of "fundamental
rights" and describing the types of controls the government may impose on companies and
individuals).
7.
The U.S. focuses less on preventive measures and typically gauges market demand and
industry self-regulation to determine appropriate levels of privacy on-line. See Gregory Shaffer,
Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and InternationalRules in the Ratcheting
Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 64 (2000). The U.S. addresses problems
because of supposed "bad-faith" data practices. The Doubleclick litigation is illustrative of this
principle. At the time, the U.S. did not have any preventive measures in place like the EU does,
and any recourse was after the fact. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Preventive legislation like the EU Directive does not fit squarely with the norm of self-regulation
utilized in the U.S.
The EU adopts the principle that privacy is a fundamental right inherent to humans. See
Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 4, at 145, 148, 150 (noting that the EU considers data privacy as
a fundamental and political right and that the U.S. system relies more on social norms, the
marketplace, and codes of conduct to protect privacy); Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet
Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877, 879-81 (2000) (arguing that five principles constitute the
foundation of U.S. privacy law: a history of balancing competing interests, respect for open flows
of information, a desire to be free of government intrusions, a requirement of specific harm and a
preference for self-help measures); see also Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 1 ('Member
States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular
their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.").
8.
See, e.g., infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; see Fred H. Cate, The ChangingFace
of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 174, 191
(1999).
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this information. 9 Third, once companies obtain consent, they must
document and register the consent with local "data authorities" who
retain the information in their own databases. 10 Fourth, during this
process, the Directive allows individuals to access their information
and allows them to request amendments and/or corrections to their
data.1 1 Finally, the Directive also allows individuals to know the
identity of the companies collecting their data. 12 Assuming that the
company uses the information consistent with its stated purpose, the
Directive then requires the company to relinquish information that
has already been used. 13 In the international context, the Directive
explicitly bars data transfers to other countries that do not provide
"adequate" data protection, as defined by the Directive. 14
In promulgating the Directive, the EU broadened the
distinction between the U.S. and EU approaches to Internet privacy,
ultimately presenting global companies with a conundrum concerning
the appropriate method to use. 15 The competing U.S. and EU
9.
See Omar Saleem, The Establishmentof a U.S. FederalData ProtectionAgency to Define
and Regulate Internet Privacy and Its Impact on U.S.-China Relations: Marco Polo Where Are
You?, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 169, 179 (2000); infra notes 79, 85 and
accompanying text. However, the EU system, while identifying "consent" as a de facto
requirement, appears to create exceptions, or at least inconsistencies, with that requirement. For
example, to my knowledge, machines like European automatic teller machines take pictures of
customers (thereby, presumably falling under the ambit of "personally identifiable information"),
but do so without "asking" every single person on every occasion if they consent to this type of
intrusion. This serves to make the Directive even more complex and, in the end, unworkable.
10. See Bruce E.H. Johnson, The Battle over Internet Privacy and the FirstAmendment, 18
No. 4 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAw., Apr. 2001, at 21-22; see also infra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text. See generally Directive, supra note 1.
11. See generally Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(a); Cate, supra note 8, at 183-84; infra note
81 and accompanying text.
12. See Alain Bensoussan, Data Protection: EU Directive and Safe Harbor Principles,
PL/PAT 291, 296 (2001).
13. Cate, supra note 8, at 182 n.48; infra notes 82, 86 and accompanying text. In the
international context, the Directive also bars, per se, data transfer to other countries that do not
provide "adequate" data protection as defined by the Directive. See Directive, supra note 1, art.
25(1); infra note 84 and accompanying text.
14. See Directive, supra note 1, art. 25(1). The Directive states that member states must
provide "adequate" protection, but falls short of providing a solid, reliable definition of the term.
15. On the one hand, some U.S. companies (or other companies outside the EU) see the
Directive as a preventive measure utilized by the EU to protect EU companies from foreign
companies entering their market. Thus, some of those companies undoubtedly contemplate the
value of adhering to every provision. On the other hand, many companies recognize that
compliance imposes serious transaction costs and destroys a significant part of the business
model in some cases. See Stephen Baker et al., Europe's Privacy Cops, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1998, at
49, 51; Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 143-44 (2000); infra notes 44, 48 and
accompanying text. As a result, companies have a difficult choice to make. See Assey &
Eleftheriou, supra note 4, at 146-47 (discussing the precarious situation businesses find
themselves in when complying with the Directive). The EU approach gives citizens a variety of
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ideologies create a unique yet frustrating problem for Internet
companies around the world,1 6 including both brick-and-mortar stores
as well as "virtual" companies. 17 Business globalization, together with
e-business growth, creates situations in which one country's laws may
have substantial effects upon those of another country.18
This Note focuses on the Directive's effect on the United States.
This Note argues that implementing a similar omnibus system in the
U.S. is not feasible.1 9 The Directive is a fagade rather than an actual,
workable solution to privacy concerns. Although some scholars offer
significant policy arguments in favor of implementing more regulation
in the U.S., the inquiry should be limited to whether the U.S. really
needs stricter privacy regulations and, more importantly, whether the
U.S. legal framework places constraints on implementing such broad
legislation instead of self-regulation. U.S. policymakers should strive
to find a workable, reasonable solution that fits within the constructs
of existing values and norms in the privacy arena rather than
institute an extremely rigid and an unworkable solution. From a
practical standpoint, this Note also contends that the EU Directive
95/46, from a practical standpoint, is not a feasible solution for the
U.S. Further, the Directive is not what it purports to be, because the
Directive is not as uniform as its proponents claim, nor does the EU
strictly enforce it. Ultimately, EU and U.S. privacy advocates who
encourage similar legislation in the U.S. appear naked without their
clothes much like the ill-fated emperor-because they encourage
legislation that will never function in reality.
Prior to analyzing this question, it will be helpful to
understand its relevance. Therefore, Part II of this Note provides
rights. EU citizens maintain the right to special information such as the identity of the person
who controls their information in addition to information regarding the reasons why companies
are processing their information. See generally Directive, supra note 1, art. 10. Further, the EU
affords its citizens the right to know who receives their data, and it also affords them the right to
amend the data should they so desire. See Bensoussan, supra note 12, at 296 nn.7-10.
16. Outside companies face the possibility of the EU barring them from trading in the EU if
they do not comply with the Directive. Companies forced into this frustrating situation must
weigh the costs of compliance against the costs of not doing business in the EU. This dilemma
creates a precarious situation for companies developing a long-term value strategy.
17. "Virtual companies" refer to purely E-commerce vendors (those which sell directly and
exclusively from the Internet).
18. Joshua S. Bauchner, Note & Comment, State Sovereignty and the Globalizing Effects of
the Internet:A Case Study of the PrivacyDebate, 26 BROOK. J. INVL L. 689, 691 (2000).
19. The EU directive affects not only U.S. business, but the U.S. legal system as well. The
U.S. has already responded to the EU Directive with the Safe Harbor provisions. See discussion
infra Part IV.B.3. If privacy advocates' suggestions are followed, more legislation will arise in the
data privacy context. Following the EU's lead in data privacy protection could hamper the
legitimate business interests of U.S. companies. See id. (discussing in detail how the EU system
effectively encroaches on the sovereignty of other countries).
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background to the U.S. and EU systems and outlines faults in the EU
system. Part III of this Note focuses on the inherent value of
information to companies, and the reasons why data transfer
restrictions create considerable problems for on-line companies. In
Part IV, this Note details the EU approach to on-line data privacy, the
traditional U.S. approach of market-based self-regulation and the Safe
Harbor approach. Parts V through VII of this Note address the fact
that a true EU-style model will not function properly within the U.S.
legal framework. In addition, Parts V, VI, and VII contend that a
carbon-copy EU-style model will: (1) interfere with the free flow of
information, (2) lack uniformity, and (3) lack appropriate enforcement
mechanisms. Finally, in Part VIII, this Note argues that, because of
the concerns raised, an EU-style regulation is not a real solution for
data privacy concerns in the U.S.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. AND EU APPROACHES TO DATA PRIVACY
The Directive's introduction prompted U.S. privacy advocates
to encourage similar legislation in this country as part of a more active
stance toward privacy regulation. 20 Many of these privacy advocates
look to the Directive as the "code" to which all companies should
conform their privacy practices. 21 Other advocates argue that the
22
current U.S. market-based approach is unsound and ineffective.
Finally, some U.S. privacy advocates foresee an EU-style system
functioning effectively in the U.S. and conforming to the U.S. legal
infrastructure .23

As a result of this debate among privacy advocates, the Federal
Trade Commission, representing the U.S., negotiated with the EU to
create some semblance of compromise. 24 These negotiations produced
20. The following organizations have all shown support for an EU-style approach in the
U.S.: the Electronic Frontier Foundation (www.eff.org), the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (www.epic.org), the American Civil Liberties Union (www.aclu.org), the Global Internet
Library Campaign (www.gilc.org), and the Internet Free Expression Alliance (www.ifea.net).
21. See Assey & Eleftheriou, supra note 4, at 147-48 (noting that the EU directive and the
resulting Safe Harbor provisions were considered groundbreaking).
22. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 787 (1999); Shaffer, supra note 6, at 64.
23. See Shaffer, supra note 6, at 64 (noting the concerns of privacy advocates that the U.S.
needs a comprehensive privacy protection approach, as opposed to a "scandal-specific" one); id. at
64 n.272 (noting that some advocates call for the use of data authorities like those in the EU); id.
at 78 (quoting Marc Rotenberg and characterizing the U.S. system of self-regulation as "smoke
and mirrors").
24. The Safe Harbor principles arose from years of negotiations between the U.S. and the
EU to reconcile these differences. See Bauchner, supra note 18, at 714; Stefania Geraci,
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the "Safe-Harbor" Principles 25 (the "Safe Harbor"), a voluntary set of
guidelines under which U.S. companies can certify to consumers 26 that
they will follow certain articulated guidelines for Internet privacy.
Proponents heralded the Safe Harbor 27 as a means for U.S. companies
to conduct business in Europe without adhering to each of the
Directive's provisions, 28 because it essentially created a backdoor route
for U.S. companies to fulfill the Directive's "adequacy" requirement. 29
Seven fundamental principles comprise the Safe Harbor 30 : (1) notice,
(2) choice, (3) onward transfer, (4) security, (5) data integrity, (6)
31
access, and (7) enforcement.
Through the Safe Harbor, the FTC tried to create a quasi-EU
regime, while still providing companies with some leverage in utilizing
consumer information for marketing purposes. 32 Despite the long
negotiations between EU representatives and their U.S. counterparts
and their attempts to create a set of regulations that strikes a balance
between the two approaches to data privacy, scholars and companies
have debated the effectiveness and functionality of the Safe Harbor
approach. 33 These debates reflect concerns that joining the Safe
Harbor often creates more problems than not joining. 34 Certification
CongressionalHearings Focus on Privacy Issues, 18 No. 4 E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY 8 (2001)
(noting commentators that support regulation by saying a formal and uniform federal standard
would be a positive step).
25. Discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
26. Companies can elect to certify themselves as a Safe Harbor company. This certification
provides notice to consumers that the company agrees to comply with the basic standards set
forth in the Safe Harbor provisions. See Tamara Loomis, Data Privacy: A Few Companies Have
Complied with the EU Law, 226 N.Y. L.J. 5, Aug. 30, 2001, at 5 (discussing the Safe Harbor
provisions and noting that under Safe Harbor, companies assert that they comply with the basic
standards

set forth by the EU);

see also U.S. DEP'T

OF COMMERCE,

SAFE HARBOR,

at

http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html, (noting that "[c]ompanies participating in
the safe harbor will be deemed adequate and data flows to those companies will continue")
27. See supra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text. The Safe Harbor was a direct result of
and is a functional equivalent to the Directive.
28. Amee A. Shah, How Human Resource Administration in a U.S. Company is Affected by
the Safe HarborDirective, 9 METRO CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2001, availableat www.westlaw.com.
29. Directive, supra note 1, § 25(1). The Directive requires that each member-state provide
"adequate" data protection. Id.
30. Discussed infra Part IV.B.3.
31. U.S.
DEP'T
OF
COMMERCE,
SAFE
HARBOR,
at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shoverview.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
32. Shah, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. The main problem with this framework is that it can impose additional jurisdictional
requirements. When companies certify under the Safe Harbor, they create their own problems by
opening themselves to the jurisdiction of the FTC, the EU, and the member states in which they
do business. The EU also does not limit its reach to physical stores in their domain. For example,
a foreign company that accesses information from an EU country could find itself subject to
another country's jurisdiction if the Internet infrastructure routes the information through a
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under the Safe Harbor automatically subjects U.S. companies to FTC
jurisdiction, along with the jurisdiction of the EU and each member
state.3 5 Theoretically, the FTC, the EU, or any member state can all
raise claims against members of the Safe Harbor.3 6 This increased
potential for litigation constitutes an obvious disincentive for any
company to join the Safe Harbor despite the attempt to retain some
37
flexibility for companies under the Safe Harbor provisions.
Substantial ramifications arise from this disincentive to join
the Safe Harbor. Although the Safe Harbor purports to encourage a
more respectful on-line environment, the reality is that an
insignificant number of U.S. companies certify themselves under the
Safe Harbor.3 8 Even with industry giants such as Microsoft and
Hewlett-Packard certified under the Safe Harbor, the number of U.S.
companies currently certified remains small. 39 Consequently, the Safe
Harbor's future remains unclear as to whether more companies will
join its ranks. This lack of participation creates a problem because
certified companies must compete on unequal planes, thereby creating
a substantial adverse economic effect on companies and their direct
40
marketing strategies.
However, in the new economy, the access and use of consumer
data are invaluable, 41 because many U.S. direct marketing
corporations rely on the ability to collect and analyze data for their
economic viability. 42 The value proposition 43 for many companies lies
third member state. This jurisdictional breadth creates a slippery slope as the next step for the
EU or the member states to start would be to impose hardware regulations and various other
technical requirements on companies. These changes result in more money spent to comply with
provisions that keep changing-which could actually decrease profitability for companies.
35. See Henry L. Judy & Benjamin S. Hayes, Between a Rock and an Unsafe HarborOptions for Compliance with the EU Data Protection Directive, ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP.
14, Mar. 2001; infra note 108 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38.

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

COMMERCE,

SAFE

HARBOR

LIST,

at

http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (providing a list of the 291
companies that have joined the Safe Harbor) (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). While some larger
companies like Microsoft have joined the list, the total number of companies remains small in
proportion to the overall number of companies that do business on-line.
39. Id.
40 See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 18 ("[B]y impeding businesses from obtaining information, more
stringent privacy protection reduces their efficiency. For example, privacy protection makes it
more difficult for firms to obtain information about job applicants' past performance.").
41. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-commerce and Trans-Atlantic Policy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 71920 (Fall 2001); Paul Rose, Comment, A Market Response to the European Union Directive on
Privacy, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 445, 449 (1999/2000); see also Cate, supra note 7, at
881-82 (discussing how companies can use information to better serve customers).
42. In the U.S., direct marketing sales accounted for 1.2 trillion dollars in 1997, and in
Europe, only 125 billion dollars. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 18-19; id. at 18 n.64; see Kevin Bloss,
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in the fact that consumers allow them to collect, disseminate, and
mine 4 4 their customer information. 45 In some cases, these data are the
company's only asset. 46 Thus, the costs of compliance with an EU-style
Raising or Razing the E-curtain?:The EU Directive on the Protection of PersonalData, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 645, 653 (2000) (noting that the U.S. remains the 'leading power" in Internet
business and that rejecting compromises could prevent EU companies from harnessing the power
of the Internet). Further, under the EU system, when companies fail to get the information,
operating costs go up. See Shaffer, supra note 6, at 18 n.62 ("Businesses may still be able to 'get
the information they need,' but only 'if they can afford the expense.' ") (quoting Stephen Baker,
Europe's Privacy Cops, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1998, at 20).
43. As defined by an EDS management consultant, a value proposition is: "How value is
going to be delivered to a client/prospect, through the execution of some strategy or tactic, and
what the expected result is going to be." Telephone Interview with Pradeep Nijhawan, EDS
consultant (Feb. 16, 2002).
44. Data mining is the practice of consolidating data into useful formats or useful
information that can be used for business purposes. "Data exchange, already a critical issue for
business, is a key to marketers' global ambitions. Their plan is to plumb databases of buying
patterns, develop thousands of detailed consumer profiles, and then hit buyers with finely tuned
pitches-preferably on-line." Baker, supra note 15, at 20.
45. Profiling consumers to provide a more customized and interactive shopping experience
provides an inherent value proposition of companies like Amazon.com. Similarly, companies like
Gap, Inc. track website visits and what items the user bought in the past. After consolidating
this information, the company then utilizes active webpages to customize the individual's
shopping experience. This practice has been used as a mutual benefit to the business as well as
the consumer long before on-line commerce evolved. Grocery stores are a classic example of this
type of practice with their "value cards." See Singleton, supra note 15, at 143-44 (2000). Singleton
explores the effects of grocery store data collection practices:
Assuming human dignity is defined, should all actions that violate human dignity be
illegal? How is human dignity offended if Safeway learns through a Safeway card that
I am in the habit of buying pineapples and do not own my own home? Our intuitive
understanding of human dignity and human rights is probably sufficient to allow us
to understand that we ought not to be subject to torture by the police, or to starve
prisoners of war. But it does not bring us to the understanding that it is wrong for
businesses to collect data about their customers without the customers' consent,
especially given the fact that we routinely do this sort of information gathering in our
ordinary private lives. While we often desire to conceal facts about ourselves from
others, we also at times have an interest in learning information about others. A
concept that sees information gathering for the purpose of commerce as an offense to
human dignity, must suppose that human dignity is very fragile. Do we really need
the federal government to protect us from being embarrassed? Can we assert a right
not to be embarrassed? Surely a government interest in protecting human dignity
must be founded on something more substantial than vague fears that someone
somewhere may obtain information about you and might use that information to try
to sell you products, or annoy you with junk mail. And how is it consonant with
human dignity to prevent businesses from communicating truthful information about
real events to other businesses?
Id. If an EU-style system were implemented in the U.S., the value of direct marketing such as
this would likely be minimized.
46. See James J. Dillon et al., Minimize the Risks of Privacy Violations When OperatingECommerce Web Sites, N.J. L.J., Sept. 16, 2002. Toysmart, in its privacy policy statement, stated
that the information collected would not be sold to any third parties or used by any third parties.
Id. When Toysmart.com filed for Chapter 11 proceedings, the company attempted to renege
silently on this policy by trying to sell the information collected in their database as an asset. Id.
Privacy groups quickly attempted to stop the selling of the data. Id. This case was novel because
the information constituted Toysmart's only real asset in their Chapter 11 proceeding.
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regime endangers the economic success of many American
companies.4 7 In addition, a dearth of hard evidence exists that the
alleged "abuse" by corporate America adversely affects consumers so
48
as to necessitate broad regulation.
In spite of these concerns, data collection practices constitute
the lifeblood of the direct marketing industry in the U.S. 49 Following
the EU's lead would therefore essentially put this country one step
closer to George Orwell's vision in 1984, not only from a business
perspective, but also from a perspective of greater government
influence over personal privacy.50 This government control would
occur because the central provisions of the EU legislation give the
government greater control over personal data, despite information
privacy being characterized as a fundamental human right. 51 The
Directive effectively expands government influence rather than
curtails it, which directly conflicts with widely held American values
regarding personal privacy. 52 Historically, U.S. citizens distrust the
government with their personal information more than they distrust
individuals. 53 Consequently, it seems counterintuitive that advocates
seek to vest additional power in the government to control their
personal data via an EU-style regulatory framework. 54 Implementing
an EU-style regulation in the U.S. as a binding provision on
companies makes little sense. U.S. companies already face significant
47. Supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48. Infra note 48 and accompanying text. It appears, however, that privacy advocates
attempt to incite emotion and gather support by creating scenarios that do not actually exist.
49. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 41, at 449; Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 719.
50. In 1984, Orwell described a social infrastructure in which the government literally had
unfettered discretion to monitor individual actors. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 23 (Penguin Books
1999) (1949).
51. See Cate, supra note 8, at 183-84 (noting that the structure of the Directive gives
substantial power to the data authorities (which remain government-sanctioned) over the flow of
data). By requiring affirmative consent from each individual, the EU creates a situation in which
personal data automatically will be linked to the names of individuals-which contradicts the
desire of privacy advocates that names not be tied to personal information. See id.
52. Traditionally, U.S. citizens have worried more about government abuse of information
than about abuse by private actors. See Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and
the First Amendment: Why a "Press Exemption" Won't Work, 80 IOWA L. REV. 639, 648 (1995)
(noting that privacy advocates support the EU model in the name of individual civil liberties).
However, supporting an EU-style model seems inapposite to the idea that the government
cannot be trusted and the idea that we want a decentralized government. Essentially, the EU
creates a more powerful government. See Charles Bogino, Privacy: EU Commissioner Says
Current U.S. Law Inadequate to Protect Financial Services, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 14,
2001 (noting significant cultural differences). For example, Americans are more concerned with
intrusion by the government into their privacy than with individuals' or companies' intrusions.
Id.
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
54. See Cate, supra note 8, at 220, 225-26.
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consequences for joining a nonbinding approach like the Safe Harbor,
and implementing such a system like the Directive in the U.S is
55
therefore likely to prove problematic.
III. THE INHERENT VALUE OF INFORMATION
Information possesses inherent value for companies. In the
digital age, companies collect and process massive amounts of
information in previously unavailable ways, 56 as the Internet makes
the collection of personal information much easier via cookies,57 click
stream data, 58 on-line surveys, 59 and registration forms,6 0 in addition
to other data collection tools. As a result, companies can collect
information in a quicker, more efficient, and less expensive manner.6 1
55. By certifying under the Safe Harbor provisions, companies subject themselves to new
jurisdictions that did not exist previously. Cf. Judy & Hayes, supra note 35. This consequence
does not provide any incentives for companies to join because it subjects U.S. companies to the
jurisdiction of the FTC. Id. Additionally, it subjects U.S. companies to higher scrutiny than
current U.S. laws even when they are in U.S. courts. Id. Further, companies incur extraordinary
costs of compliance when adhering to the EU Directive or joining the Safe Harbor. Id.
56. See Erin M. Egan, Internet Privacy, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, MAR. 22, 2001, at 527,
529; infra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that information is collected in unprecedented
ways on a worldwide level).
57. Companies use cookies (among other tools) to collect data from consumers. See Anna
Shimanek, Do You Want Milk with Those Cookies? Complying with the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 457, 460-61 (2001) (providing an excellent discussion of different
business methods companies use to collect information (including cookies, clickstream data,
etc.));
SEARCHSECURITY.COM,DEFINITIONS:COOKIE,
at
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinitionO,,sidl4_gci211838,00.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2003):
A cookie is information that a Web site puts on your hard disk so that it can
remember something about you at a later time. (More technically, it is information for
future use that is stored by the server on the client side of a client/server
communication.) Typically, a cookie records your preferences when using a particular
site. Using the Web's Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), each request for a Web
page is independent of all other requests.
58. See SEARCHSYSTEMSMANAGEMENT.COM ("In Web advertising, a click stream is the
sequence of clicks or pages requested as a visitor explores a Web site.") (quoting from
"whatis.com"
website
search),
at
http /searchwebmanagement.techtarget.com/sDefinitionO,,sid27-gci2 11794,00.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2002).
59. See Shimanek, supra note 57, at 460-61.
60. Id.
61. See Egan, Internet Privacy, supra note 56, at 529 (noting that the Internet has
dramatically improved "the ability of companies to gather personal information"). Websites and
computer technology make it quite easy for one to "collect, reproduce, disseminate, and compile"
individual information. Ruth Hill Bro, Privacy and Data Protection in the Business-to-Business
Context, in SOLVING THE LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING B2B TRANSACTIONS, at 321, 323 (Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. 60-OONF,
2001). For example, companies can use forms, E-mails, cookies, and other tools. Id. Further,
website payment systems often collect details about the parties to the transaction, as well as
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This information collection provides invaluable benefits to both
Internet companies and brick-and-mortar companies 62 due to the high
premium for information on the open market. In other words, the
essence of effective business in the information economy is in efficient
information control practices.63 Timely, refined customer information
gives companies a strategic advantage in the virtual marketplace
because it provides companies with a powerful weapon over
competitors in developing marketing strategies. 64 In fact, the future of
an on-line business depends on its ability to secure information. 65 As
one commentator has noted:
Companies engaging in electronic commerce have a significant interest in personal data,
and its transfer online. Transborder data flow has become indispensable to the very
existence of transnational enterprise and to the currently flourishing global
marketplace ....
[I]nformation is the lifeblood that sustains political, social, and
business decisions. 66

Quality information control practices remain pivotal to
customer service. For example, information gathering gives companies
the ability to target products and advertisements specifically to their
customers. 6 7 Additionally, free-flowing information allows companies
details about the transactions themselves. As companies share this information with affiliates,
large databases of information are built. See Reidenberg, supra note 65, at 720 ("E-commerce
leaves an extensive trail of personal information. Internet service providers and Web sites log
user interactions for technical and commercial operations."); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property?,52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 & n.2 (2000) ("The technical infrastructure of
cyberspace makes it remarkably simple and inexpensive to collect substantial amounts of
information identifiable to particular individuals." ) (citing Cate and Kang articles).
62. See infra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that information is the lifeblood of the
on-line industry).
63. See Rose, supra note 41, at 449 (noting that on-line companies profit greatly from these
data collection practices). As a primary business, several companies track consumer data and
collect this information for business and marketing purposes. Some examples include "Engage
Technologies, Acxiom, DoubleClick, and Clickstream." Id.; see also Shimanek, supra note 57, at
457 n.9 (noting that consumer companies consider databases to be an intangible asset in the
marketplace since they use them to create targeted advertisements and develop marketing
strategies).
64. Id.
65. "Online commercial transactions depend on both the creation and availability of
unprecedented and extensive data about individuals." Reidenberg, supranote 41, at 719-20.
66. Bauchner, supra note 18, at 709 (emphasis added) (quoting Anne W. Branscomb, Global
Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of TransborderData Flow in Transition, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 985, 989 (1991)).
67. This type of information freedom remains fundamental to a market economy. Consumer
needs are reflected in a desire to have products delivered on time and to have their further needs
predicted by companies. Companies satiate these needs, in part, by collecting and disseminating
this information so that the needs are met in real time. Ultimately, these practices are enabling,
not only for companies, but for consumers as well-the question, or the issue, must be framed in
the appropriate manner. Cate, supra note 7, at 881-82. "The ready availability of public record
'data facilitates a vibrant economy, improves efficiency, reduces costs, creates jobs, and provides
valuable products and services that people want.' " Id. at 884 (quoting FRED H. CATE & RICHARD
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to profile its customers more effectively in order to provide the goods
and services that consumers want. 68 All of these benefits keep the
direct marketing industry alive. As noted above, however, while the
marketplace places a high value on information, the EU and the U.S.
take very different paths in the procurement, propagation, and most
importantly, the protection of personal information collected on the
69
Internet.
IV. FRAMEWORK OF THE EU AND U.S. MODELS FOR DATA PROTECTION
A. The EUApproach
The EU approaches data privacy in a much more robust
fashion than its U.S. counterpart. 70 Instead of relying on social norms
or on a market-based laissez-faire system, the EU enacted broad
legislation and promulgated regulations that significantly affect data
flow across national borders. 71 Unfortunately for its U.S.
counterpart, 72 the EU regulations impose stricter standards than the
morals of the marketplace. Ultimately, the EU system rests on the
foundation that information privacy is a fundamental human right, 7 3
and it also allows individuals to control the way in which companies
collect and use their information. As one commentator noted:
The EU Directive recognizes privacy as a fundamental human right. The EU Directive's
guidelines for information privacy are: personal data is collected for specific legitimate
purposes; the data must be relevant, accurate, current, not excessive and kept no longer
than necessary; personal data may be processed only if the Internet user has
unambiguously given consent (or under specified exceptions); member states must
establish supervisory bodies, (e.g., commissions, regulatory agencies) and remedies for a

J. VARN, THE PUBLIC RECORD: INFORMATION PRIVACY AND ACCESS-A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
FINDING THE BALANCE 10 (1999)).

68. Id. at 881-82.
69. Supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
70. See Jonathan M. Winer, If the US is From Mars and the EU is From Venus, What Do
You Do in Cyberspace?, PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP., Apr. 2001 (noting that the EU takes a much
broader approach in that "if it moves, we regulate it" and that the U.S. takes a self-regulation
approach).
71. See Bloss, supra note 42, at 650-51 (noting that the U.S., not the EU, uses a laissez-faire
system predicated on self-regulation).
72. The term "counterpart" refers to U.S. lawmaking bodies in general. For purposes of this
discussion, privacy regulations can come from the FTC, Congress, state legislatures or agencies,
or any other lawmaking body.
73. See Samuelson, supra note 61, at 1170 (noting that Europeans "have identified
information privacy as a fundamental value that should be a keystone of the architecture for
achieving an information society in which people will want to live"). Pamela Samuelson offers the
proposition that a large part of the problem might be that no clarity exists as to how U.S. citizens
actually value their on-line privacy. She does note, however, that a lack of proper definition of
the nature of interest involved is a large part of the problem. Id. at 1170-71.
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breach of privacy rights; and, transfer of data to a third country is restricted unless the
third country has an adequate level of protection for data privacy 74

At a conceptual level, Europeans are traditionally more apprehensive
about free transfer of personal information to companies or other
individuals. 75 Accordingly, the EU uses a prophylactic approach with
regard to abuse of personal information.7 6 As part of this approach,
the Directive provides exacting standards that the member states and
companies must meet before companies in those states can collect and
use personal information from EU citizens. 77 It requires: 1) that
personal ownership of information and consent to use this information
be shown, 2) that the information be used for its specified purposes,
and 3) that companies provide an "adequate" level of protection.
1. Personal Ownership and Consent
The Directive provides for personal ownership of data,
individual access rights to data from data controllers, and individual
consent to the use of personal data. 78 Member state laws must allow
data subjects to "correct, erase or block the transfer of inaccurate or
incomplete data," and they must allow for the erasure of personal data
without cost. 79 The Directive requires that companies use personal
information only for "specific and clearly stated purposes" when

74. Saleem, supra note 8, at 177; see also Barbara Crutchfield George, U.S. Multinational
Employers: Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor"Principles to Comply With the EU Data
Privacy Directive, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 735, 742-43 (2001) (noting that EU legislators based the EU's
data privacy laws upon this fundmental right).
75. George, supra note 74, at 743; see id. at 741 n.23, 744-45 (providing a discussion on the
evolution of European data privacy laws and noting that the Spanish Constitution includes
privacy rights, while similar UK legislation acknowledges the "right to respect" for individuals'
private lives); Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 731 (noting that in the EU, "citizens trust
government more than the private sector with personal information").
76. Winer, supra note 70. Advocates view the Directive as more protective of privacy rights
than U.S. laws and regulations. Id. This is because the EU recognizes privacy as a fundamental
right, and the EU requires that national laws exist with regard to Internet privacy. See Saleem,
supra note 8, at 177.
77. See generally Directive, supra note 1.
78. Id. art. 12(a). Generally, a data controller is the person or company that is collecting
information from the customer on the Internet-the EU grants the consumer access rights to
this information and also allows the customer to receive confirmation that his information is only
being used in ways approved by her. Privacy advocates also refer to this as "information selfdetermination." TERRY R. BRODERICK, REGULATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 73-74 (2000) (noting that Article 12(a) provides a data subject with rights to
confirmation of whether data relating to her is being processed); see, e.g., Cate, supra note 8, at
183 (discussing the Directive's mechanics with regard to information access and use in the EU);
Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 782 n.52; see id. at 183 n.52.
80. Cate, supra note 8, at 183.
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conducting business in the EU.8 0 It further mandates that companies
obtain individual consent before information may be collected.8 1 The
Directive requires that companies must not only obtain consent from
each individual, but also that they verify this consent with a data
authority8 2 before processing the information. Once a company collects
personal information, the Directive imposes additional constraints on
the use of this information and the length of time a company may
83
retain this information.
2. Data Can Be Used Only for Specified Purposes
The Directive imposes additional controls by requiring that
companies use data for only those purposes that the business
previously identified.8 4 Ultimately, the specific use requirements of
the Directive impose stricter data controls on data transfer than those
currently applied in the U.S. While this does not pose a significant
problem within the EU, it creates substantial problems in the
international context, particularly in information transfers between
the EU and the U.S., because any collected information must be
destroyed immediately after its use. This practice deprives companies
of valuable information and causes tensions in the international
context when one analyzes the "adequacy" requirement.
3. The Adequacy Requirement
The Directive states that countries outside of the EU must
provide an "adequate" level of protection before they can collect and

80. Keith Perine, How Private is Private Enough?, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Feb. 28, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 31584579.
81. Cate, supra note 8, at 191. The Directive also provides a catch-all by stating that the
individual should be able to "opt-out" (for direct marketing purposes) at any time. Id. at 191 n.88.
82. See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text (noting that as a surrogate of the
government, data authorities (supervisory authorities) retain the authority to investigate data
processing between companies and individuals. The Directive grants them access rights to the
information. Data authorities also serve the purpose of documenting consent from individuals
and storing that information. Finally, the Directive grants them the power to interfere with the
flow of information if companies violate member state law(s)).
83. Cate, supra note 8, at 182.
84. The Directive grants "European citizens absolute control over data concerning them. If
a company wants personal information, it must get that person's permission and explain for
what purposes the information will be used. It must also promise not to use it for anything else
without the citizen's consent." Baker et al., supra note 15, at 20; see also Bruce C. Doeg & Jason
Epstein, Small Small World: Even U.S.-Focused Web Sites Can Trigger Global Legal Concerns,
LEGAL TIMES, June 4, 2001 (noting that the Directive provides protections that allow "collecting
data only for 'specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes'" and for obtaining consent); Cf. Winer,
supra note 76 (noting that personal information must be destroyed when it is no longer needed).
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disseminate information gathered from EU citizens.8 5 The Directive
does not, however, provide a bright-line definition of "adequate."
Because the term is open to extensive interpretation, the Directive
ultimately forces companies to attempt to conform their behavior to a
highly subjective standard.
The Directive grants member states a certain amount of
autonomy in deciding what level of privacy protections they may
invoke to meet the adequacy requirement. Provided that the
protections remain at a level at least equal to the minimum
requirements of the Directive, 86 member states remain free to
institute policies and regulations that are more demanding than those
required by the Directive. 87 At least in theory, the Directive's
adequacy requirement creates the potential for ten to fifteen
independent data privacy policies within the EU, rather than a single
88
cohesive piece of legislation.
B. The U.S. Approach
Reconciliation between the EU and the U.S. approaches to
privacy regulation remains difficult because of their contrasting core
values regarding personal privacy over the Internet. 89 Both the EU
85. The Directive explains the assessment of whether a third country offers an
"adequate" level of protection:
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data
transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data,
the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the
country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and
security measures which are complied with in that country.
Directive, supra note 1, art. 25(2).
86. Bensoussan, supra note 12, at 294; see Cate, supra note 8, at 185 (noting that the
Directive imposes only minimum protections and that each member state can adopt more
stringent policies).
87. See Bensoussan, supra note 12, at 296 (noting that the Directive gives data subjects the
right to certain information, and that they retain the right to know the identity of the controller
and her representative, "as well as, information regarding the purposes of the processing of the
data"); see Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 733 n.100 (noting the Directive grants member states
authority to enact their own independent, national supervisory authority to enforce their privacy
provisions) (citing the Directive, supra note 1, art. 28(1)).
88. The possible number of different privacy regulations depends on the number of member
states.
89. See George, supra note 74, at 741 (noting the tension created as a result of differing
cultural and legal attitudes between the U.S. and the EU). Though this specific instance referred
to data privacy practices in the employment context, the same general principle applies in the
EU outside of the workplace context. Id.
See Cate, supra note 8, at 179 (noting that U.S. and EU core values conflict and that laws
and legal regimes from one country affect other countries because of the global nature of data);
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and the U.S. recognize the privacy needs of consumers. The U.S.
system, however, balances personal privacy interests against the
competing legitimate economic interest in collecting and utilizing
public information for business purposes. 90
Unlike the EU, the U.S. adopts a self-regulatory approach to
Internet privacy regulation, dictated by the morals of the
marketplace. 91 Grounded primarily in industry norms and industry
reactions to market pressures, the U.S. has not adopted the same
broad, prophylactic rule 92. Generally, the U.S. prefers less government
interference with privacy rights and prefers less overarching
legislation. 93 Because U.S. history indictates a disdain for broad,
omnibus data privacy legislation, this country arguably views
overarching legislation as the least-preferred method in most
situations. 94 Therefore, privacy advocates clash with the industry
leaders who argue that larger government influence is inapposite to

cf. George, supra note 74, at 741-50 (noting the clash of privacy values between the U.S. and the
EU).
Professor Cate also notes: "If a regulatory approach is to be pursued, then global standards
are necessary. But the conflict between the core values of the European and U.S. systems of
privacy protection makes global consensus on effective privacy standards little more than a
mirage." Cate, supra note 8, at 228; see also Saleem, supra note 9, at 178 (noting that the
differing practices of the EU and the U.S. with regard to Internet privacy reflect the legal and
cultural differences between the two entities).
90. See Bloss, supra note 42, at 650-51 (arguing that the U.S. approach creates economic
advantages in the marketplace). This paradigm has yet to take hold in Europe, thus these
differing points of view result in the two different approaches to privacy. Id.
91. See Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 787 (suggesting inadequacies of the U.S. selfregulation approach); see also Shimanek, supra note 57, at 465-71 (noting that no comprehensive
right to information privacy exists in the U.S.). In contrast to regulating individuals, Professor
Fred Cate notes that the U.S. historically depends on "private industry, private property, and
individual self-reliance." Cate, supra note 8, at 223. Cate further argues that "Constitutional
rights are generally negative; they do not obligate the government to do anything, but rather to
refrain from unnecessarily interfering with individuals' freedom to act." Id.; see also Samuelson,
supra note 61, at 1127-1128 n.14. (stating that many Americans prefer the market-based
approach). See, e.g., Thomas Reith III, Consumer Confidence: The Key to Successful E-commerce
in the Global Marketplace, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 467, 477 (2001).
92. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 27.
93. See Cate, supra note 7, at 881 (noting that across-the-board rules and regulations are
usually not sufficient, because they do not achieve their purpose and fail to provide sufficient
solutions). Ultimately, the court must make an independent inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of each case when constitutional rights are at stake. Id.
94. Cate, supra note 7, at 887 (stating that general distrust of the government results in a
preference for market-based solutions); see also Rose, supra note 41, at 446 n.7 (arguing that the
self-regulation approach remains superior in the digital age, because "private efforts of industry
working in cooperation with consumer groups are preferable to government regulation").
(citations omitted). The right to privacy expands slowly, as Congress has rejected numerous
attempts to enact omnibus regulation.

956

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:939

American values. 95 Couched in distrust of large government and the
belief that the government should first show actual interest in
regulating privacy, the U.S. system differs from that of the EU.
96
1. Distrust of Large Government

The possibility of the government surreptitiously monitoring
individual behavior or controlling personal information concerns many
Americans. 97 The general distrust of a large and powerful
government, 98 with unfettered discretion to monitor potential
impositions on privacy, leads courts to scrutinize proposed privacy
regulations carefully. 99 Relying more on market controls and selfregulation, a less-is-more approach to governmental control over
private information underlies American privacy law.100
2. The Government Must Show Some Actual Interest in Regulating
Privacy
Whether infringement arises from actual monitoring of
behavior or via strict regulations or laws, courts generally require the
government to show more than a modicum of interest in regulating
privacy.10 1 Instead, the government must demonstrate a compelling
government interest to infringe these rights. 10 2 Hastily passing

95. See Cate, supra note 8, at 174 (noting that public interest zealots and industry leaders
clash over how much influence the U.S. government should have over privacy).
96. This Note is intended to address "normal" situations. For example, in a post-September
11 world, many citizens welcome more government influence than they would ordinarily.
Government initiatives, like the Patriot Act, the FBI's Carnivore technology, and the National
Strategy to Protect Cyberspace all represent a possible shift (at least to some extent) of U.S.
norms regarding government influence in personal privacy.
97. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
98. See We Know You're Reading This: Privacy Issues, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996 ('Trusting
the government with your privacy is like having a Peeping Tom install your window blinds.")
(citations omitted), available at 1996 WL 8670907. Other U.S. values conflict with the right to
privacy. Even if these other valued did not exist, the principle of a limited government still
stands in the way of creating a government privacy agent. Cate, supra note 8, at 226; see
Samuelson, supra note 61, at 1173 (arguing that Americans' interests in information privacy
conflict with the desire for a strong information economy).
99. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 6 (noting that Americans distrust centralized government
involvement in the data privacy arena); see id. at 23 n.82 (providing a discussion of why U.S.
citizens distrust the government and why U.S. privacy laws remain market-based).
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
102. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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legislation may prove harmful in the cyber age. 0 3 Many advocates
seek a middle ground, as the risk of maintaining two competing
privacy regimes creates a precarious situation.104 With these
considerations in mind, the FTC and the EU negotiated a common
ground-the Safe Harbor, a voluntary method for U.S. companies to
comply with the Directive-a solution which stands in stark contrast
to strict, overarching, binding regulation sought by privacy advocates.
3. The Safe Harbor Solution
As the U.S. and the EU disagree on how to regulate Internet
privacy, extensive negotiations between the two entities produced the
Safe Harbor, which provides a voluntary alternative for U.S.
companies that want to do business in Europe in spite of the dictates
of the EU Directive. 10 5 Seven fundamental principles are embodied in
the Safe Harbor. The specific provisions are: (1) notice, (2) choice, (3)
onward transfer, (4) security, (5) data integrity, (6) access, and (7)
enforcement. 106
Three main concerns cause companies to hesitate joining the
Safe Harbor: (1) the cost of joining, (2) the jurisdictional hook, and (3)
the fact that, to date, only a small number of companies have certified.
Safe Harbor presents another set of problems, however, for U.S.
companies that certify themselves under its provisions. In order to
comply, companies must incur substantial costs to ensure that their
10 7
data management processes meet threshold requirements.
Companies view these entry and transaction costs as a major
impediment to joining.
Further, certifying companies subject themselves to an entirely
new set of regulations and a new jurisdiction, because they must still
adhere to member state law if they maintain a physical presence

103. Protecting privacy requires that the government "proceed cautiously rather than run
pell-mell toward new laws that risk unintended and self-defeating consequences." Winer, supra
note 63.
104. Winer, supra note 70.
105. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 28.
106. For a detailed description of each of these principles, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SAFE HARBOR, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh-overview.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
107. Loomis, supra note 26, at 5. See id. (noting that Microsoft spent over one-half million
dollars to comply with the Safe Harbor). In addition, companies must incur substantial
administration/disclosure costs to ensure ongoing compliance with the Safe Harbor. Id. Safe
Harbor requires companies to post privacy policies that identify them as Safe Harbor companies,
and they also must file a self-certification letter with the Department of Commerce. Bro, supra
note 61, at 328.
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there.10 8 In addition, by certifying, companies consent to FTC
jurisdiction. 109 Companies that participate view this broadened
jurisdiction as a disincentive because they involuntarily subject
themselves to higher scrutiny than under current U.S. law, while the
FTC does not subject non-Safe Harbor companies to these additional
constraints. 11 0 Finally, many companies see no upside to joining the
Safe Harbor because an insignificant number of companies have
certified to date. 1 In sum, certification under Safe Harbor does not
create a long-term value proposition 1 2 for many companies. As the
Directive and similar regulations like the Safe Harbor fail to garner
industry support, EU-style regulations also face strict constitutional
challenges-for example, under the First Amendment principle of free
flow of information.
V. THE EU DIRECTIVE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The EU Directive clashes directly with the First Amendment
principle of free flow of information and vests power in the
government rather than in the individual. Justice Brandeis defined
privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and what extent information
about them is communicated to others."1 13 While this definition
sufficed in a world that dealt only with actual physical contact or
intrusion into people's homes, it fails to explain fully the privacy
concerns in an on-line environment.1 14 As the status of privacy law on
the Internet remains in flux, many privacy advocates argue for a

108. See Judy & Hayes, supra note 35 (noting that a significant problem arises because
companies who qualify themselves become subject to enforcement actions by other government
entities). Further, while the Safe Harbor keeps companies from having to register with data
protection authorities in the EU, those companies are still subject to any country's local law in
which they have a physical presence.
109. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
110. As a result, companies certified under the Safe Harbor not only must elevate their data
protection to comply with EU law, but they also must institute this higher protection in the U.S.,
thereby subjecting themselves to a higher standard in the U.S. Judy & Hayes, supra note 35.
LIST,
at
COMMERCE,
SAFE
HARBOR
il1. U.S.
DEP'T
OF
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list (providing a list of the 328
companies that have joined the Safe Harbor ranks) (last visited Apr. 15, 2003). Industry has
embraced these principles in a lethargic and unenthusiastic manner, and its view can be
summed up in the statement by a partner at the law firm of Proskauer, Rose: "It's not obvious
that the benefits [of Safe Harbor] outweigh the costs." Loomis, supra note 26, at 5.
112. For a definition of "value proposition," see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
113. Cate, supra note 7, at 877 (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967)).
114. Id. at 877; see Saleem, supra note 9, at 176 (noting that theories concerning the
appropriate solution are in a state of flux).
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broader, more omnibus legislative solution.115 However, this approach
conflicts with the bedrock First Amendment ' 16 policy concerning the
117
free flow of information.
Alhough it is not absolute, American citizens cherish this right
to privacy 11 8 and are suspicious of government.1 1 9 Adopting an allencompassing privacy regulation would contravene these First
Amendment rights.1 20 As Solveig Singleton recognized, "[a]n omnibus
system of privacy regulation would mark an extremely radical change
in the legal framework for the flow of information through the
economy."1 21 Many privacy advocates, however, tend to downplay this
principle when analyzing the EU Directive.
Citing consumer respect and consumer safety, many U.S.
privacy advocates lobby for legislation tightening on-line privacy
controls yet tend to ignore the current "free-flowing" infrastructure in
which U.S. companies operate. These advocates also ignore the
constitutional hurdles that limit the passage of broad legislation. The
First Amendment certainly does not preclude all legislation or
regulation in the privacy context, but it does pose a significant hurdle
to overarching information privacy legislation, or regulation similar to
the Directive. 122 Courts generally subject any type of regulation
encroaching on First Amendment values to the highest level of
scrutiny.1 23 However, many consumers and privacy advocates believe
that the sheer amount of information that companies collect about

115. Cf. Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 787 (arguing against the self-regulation model and
advocating a solution that utilizes a combination of law and technology).
116. See, e.g., Kirtley, supra note 52, at 644-46 (noting the general First Amendment
preference for the free flow of information).
117. See, e.g., supra note 9, at 23 (describing how several business groups opposed a
comprehensive privacy law because of First Amendment issues). Although legislation similar to
the EU Directive was suggested in Washington, those bills were rejected and received heavy
opposition from the Privacy-Plus Coalition. See Barbara S. Wellberry, Bridging the Difference:
The Safe Harbor and InformationPrivacy in the United States and the European Union, PRIVACY
& INFO. L. REP., Feb. 2001 (stating that the First Amendment requires a balance between
individual privacy rights and the free flow of information).
118. Wellberry, supra note 117.
119. See id.
120. Singleton, supra note 15, at 133.
121. Id. at 133-34.
122. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 8, at 203-204 (discussing the First Amendment implications
of proposed broad legislation).
123. This scrutiny involves a detailed analysis into the facts of each case and requires careful
judicial review. See Cate, supra note 7, at 880-81 and accompanying text; cf. Ronald
Krotoszynski, Jr., Identity, Privacy, and the New Information Scalpers: Recalibratingthe Rules of
the Road in the Age of the Infobahn: A Response to Fred H. Cate, 33 IND. L. REV. 233, 240 (1999)
("mhe First Amendment value in distributing highly personal information about average
citizens is, at best, very low.").
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individuals and the way in which they use this information is cause
for alarm, and in turn, greater regulation.124
It therefore seems that support for change in on-line business
practices is growing as privacy advocates contend that the U.S. also
needs a comprehensive approach to the regulation of data privacy,
rather than its current method of post hoc reactions to market
demands. 125 As one scholar notes, "reliance on self-regulation is not an
appropriate mechanism to achieve the protection of basic political
rights. Self-regulation in the U.S. reduces privacy protection to an
uncertain regime of notice and choice."'126 Indeed, companies and
legislators face a legal issue unique to the Internet, because
companies and the government can accumulate vast stores of personal
information with minimal effort and cost.127
Given this capacity to collect information in a previously
unimaginable way, jurisprudential guideposts in the U.S. and abroad
are shifting to create scenarios in which companies must watch over
their shoulders before they use personal information. As cyberlaw
scholar Pamela Samuelson noted:
Work must continue on evolving norms about appropriateand inappropriateuses of
personal data, on persuading firms that the trust necessary for electronic commerce to
flourish requires the interests of individuals in information privacy to be given
appropriate deference, and on adapting the technological infrastructure of cyberspace so
that information privacy becomes easier to achieve. The principal challenge of these
multifaceted endeavors is not to recreate in cyberspace some preexisting zone of privacy
from the physical world, but to articulate values inhering in information privacy that
128
should constrain and structure social, economic, technological, and legal relations.

124. See We Know You're Reading This, supra note 98, at 27 (noting that privacy concerns
arise not just from companies and other people accessing your information, but also from the
government). The article provides a hypothetical of a "hero" consumer and the fear of
information collected about him:
On a typical day, for example, our hero's driving route may be tracked by an
intelligent traffic system. At work, his employer can legally listen in on his business
conversations on the telephone, and tap into his computer, e-mail, or voice mail. At
the shopping center, the ubiquitous closed-circuit camera may soon be smart enough
to seek him out personally. His clothes shop is allowed to put peepholes in the fitting
rooms; some have hidden microphones, too. The grocery stores information about him
if he is a member of its buyers' club.
Id.
125. See Shaffer, supra note 6, at 64 (noting that privacy advocates believe that the U.S.
needs "a comprehensive approach to privacy protection, not a fragmented, scandal-specific one").
126. Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 726.
127. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 41 (noting the vast amount of information to which on-line
businesses have access); see also Cate, supra note 8, at 178 (noting the various types of
information collected from on-line users).
128. See Samuelson, supra note 61, at 1129-30 (emphasis added).
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Fortunately, broad legislation, such as the EU Directive,' 29 has not
been passed in the U.S., but many American privacy advocates still
push for such legislation.130 Some advocates even argue for a
reasonable limit on the "seemingly ceaseless forward march of
31
modernity."'
A. How Much Government Involvement?
Even if the public acquiesces to a curtailment of the free flow of
information, a threshold question concerning the role of the
government in privacy regulation lingers as the subject of heated
debate. 132 "The critical question is whether 'new wine can be poured
successfully into an old bottle,' or whether new legal norms must be
devised for the governance of the Networld."' 33 On their face, these
proposals for broad legislation appear benign and purportedly
represent the best interests of Americans despite their curtailment of
the free flow of information. Congress and agenices should not
institute broad regulation, however, without an appreciation of the
historical balance between the interests of government and the
individual.134 The value added from data collection regulation must be
35
weighed against the value of free flow of information.

129. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 123, at 236-38; see also Cate, supra note 8, at 179, n.31
(noting that Internet users believe that the government should pass laws to protect privacy and
noting that privacy will be the issue of the future, much as the environmental movement affected
the twentieth-century industrial society). Id. at n.32.
130. See Shaffer, supra note 22, at 4.
131. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 123, at 139, 239 ("As one commentator has wryly
observed, reliance on market mechanisms and self-regulation to protect privacy is tantamount to
'putting Count Dracula in charge of the blood bank.' ") Krotoszynski argues that this movement
runs akin to the labor union movement, and he states that people need the government to secure
privacy rights, much as labor unions ensured parity between workers and management during
labor negotiations. Id.
132. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 7, at 880-83 (noting the pivotal question of what role the
government should have in resolving this debacle).
133. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the
First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1647 (2001). See, e.g., Saleem, supra note 9,
at 196 ("[I]f the U.S. establishes a Federal Data Protection Agency to regulate privacy, the
international scope and impact of such an agency must be thoroughly considered.").
134. See Cate, supra note 7, at 878; Bauchner, supra note 18, at 707 ("At the heart of this
issue is an attempted balance between individuals' privacy and the need to transmit data
relating to individuals, particularly in the Information Age.").
135. The U.S. government has acknowledged the need to balance personal privacy in
network environments with such principles as the First Amendment free flow of information.
Bauchner, supra note 18, at 712 nn.154-55; see also Cate, supra note 8, at 220 (noting that the
free flow of data/information embodies the "cornerstone of a democratic society and market
economy").
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This principle applies both when the U.S. government seeks to
collect information and, in the situation of the EU Directive,when it
seeks to interfere with the collection or dissemination of information
by private parties. 136 Although the government might not be the entity
collecting the information, the government still interferes with the
free flow of information when it enacts broad legislation that curtails
information collection. 137 Thus, because courts subject regulations
affecting the free flow of information in the private sphere to
heightened scrutiny, 138 courts should also require that the government
show a strong interest in the enactment of broad legislation. 139 This
argument for heightened scrutiny is not to say that proposed privacy
regulation will never pass muster under constitutional standards, but
it is indicative of the hurdle that privacy advocates must overcome to
140
enact such legislation or regulation.
B. Privacy Versus the Ability to Learn About Your Neighbor
If a regulation similar to the EU Directive were implemented
in the U.S., the regulatory framework would face serious problems
under the First Amendment when the issue is analyzed from another
angle. The First Amendment also historically protects the ability to
freely learn about other people in ordinary business interactions and

136. The Directive regulates and inhibits the free flow of information collected by both
companies and government. This regulation is in stark contrast to the current U.S. legal
infrastructure. In the U.S., legislature usually imposes Constitutional limits (if any) on the free
flow of information against the government, not against individuals or companies. Thus, it
follows that the Constitutional guarantee of free flow of information is invoked when the
government attempts to thwart the private sector from collecting information for personal or
business reasons vis-A-vis broad, overarching regulations and legislation. See, e.g., Winer, supra
note 63. The Directive allows EU citizens to retain rights over their personal information that
effectively inhibit, and in some cases, stop the flow of information by giving "them the rights to
see, copy, correct, erase, and limit sharing of their personal data." Id. at 65.
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
138. See Cate, supra note 7, at 881 n.12 (citing cases in which the Court applied heightened
scrutiny).
139. "Laws that put in place broad restrictions on the flow of information, rather than
require sensitive balances to prevent specified harms, are constitutionally problematic." Id. at
881.
140. See id. at 882. ("Laws that restrict that free flow almost always conflict with this basic
principle. That does not mean that such laws are never upheld, but merely that they face a
considerable constitutional hurdle."); see id. at 887 (noting that the court typically allows the free
flow of information absent a compelling government interest to restrict information). A
substantial problem involves balancing legitimate corporate interests in gathering and
disseminating market information with individuals' interests to keep information about them
private and outside of the public eye. David E. Brown, Jr., From the Editor: Privacy, Commerce
and the FirstAmendment, ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP., MAY 2001.

2003]

THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES

963

in day-to-day contacts. 141 Contrary to privacy advocates' claims, the
collection of information actually helps one learn about her neighbor,
which can prevent false information from being spread. However,
when addressing the Directive, many privacy advocates appear to seek
a virtual world of complete anonymity in on-line transactions-a
world in which one cannot link personal information back to an
individual.142 This solution not only runs counter to protecting the free
flow of information, but it can actually cause problems with individual
43
accountability. 1
To support this proposition, Judge Richard Posner notes that
privacy can sometimes impose serious costs on society. 44 He
acknowledges that, in many cases, misleading people with whom one
conducts business creates a motive to conceal information.1 45 Posner
argues that private information, if revealed, actually serves to correct
misapprehensions about individuals. 146 Indeed, too much privacy can
facilitate the promulgation of false information and can impose
substantial costs on society. 4 7 Furthermore, Posner questions the
actual harm of "casual prying," which he posits does not necessarily
create a substantial threat (within reasonable limits). 48 According to
Posner, "[p]rying enables one to form a more accurate picture of a
141. Restricting information flow usually raises First Amendment concerns, because the
First Amendment allows individuals to learn about each other during business and other day-today occurrences. See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 15, at 152.
142. See Reith, supra note 91, at 749 (stating that the EU tries to foster consumer confidence
by "increasing transparency of on-line transactions").
143. Absolute anonymity could prevent on-line accountability, while full accountability could
prohibit anonymity. Complete autonomy over information flow could stop individuals from
accessing general information that is beneficial to society. Branscomb, supra note 133, at 1645.
144.
Much of the demand for privacy ... concerns discreditable information, often
information concerning past or present criminal activity or moral conduct at variance
with a person's professed moral standards. And often the motive for concealment is
... to mislead those with whom he transacts. Other private information that people
wish to conceal, while not strictly discreditable, would if revealed correct
misapprehensions that the individual is trying to exploit.
Cate, supra note 8,at 221-22 (citing Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393,
399 (1978)).
145. Id. at 221.
146. Id. at 222.
147. Privacy can cause the dessimination of false information, and it interferes with
business's ability to make informed decisions based on individualized information. This
interference creates transaction costs because companies then have to determine the accuracy of
the information they do have. Id. In addition, future losses can result because of the inaccurate
and incomplete information. Id.
148. Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 395-96 (1978));
see also id. at 222 ("Information is the lifeblood that sustains political, social, and business
decisions.") (quoting Anne W. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of
TransborderDataFlow in Transition,36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 987 (1983)).
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friend or colleague, and the knowledge gained is useful in one's social
or professional dealings with him."149 Under this view, too much
privacy can be detrimental to society. The Directive's ramifications
actually include lower quality of information being transferred,
because the Directive grants consumers a veto power over others'
ability to learn about them. 150 Unfortunately, this veto power could
cause adverse effects on the market. 151 In sum, regulation of
information disclosure often creates positive effects, but major
problems do exist when regulating the actual collection of information.
Recent scholarship has noted that requiring companies to disclose how
information is used would meet applicable constitutional standards
but that other restrictions, such as data collection restrictions, may
152
not square with sound First Amendment policy.
The traditional U.S. theory posits that each industry knows the
best regulatory framework to implement with regard to data privacy
in that industry's respective field. 53 In contrast, EU policymakers are
concerned that this will ultimately incentivize companies to inject
their consumers' information into an unregulated market, which could
lead to exploitation of the consumers' information. 54 An EU-style

149. Id. at 222 n.314; see also Singleton, supra note 15, at 152 (maintaining that the
collection of more information about consumers alleviates many security problems).
150. Cate notes the decline in the quality of information on-line that results from
tightened regulation:
Europe's experience shows us that the total effect of such regulations is a reduction in
the amount and quality of information that has flowed freely in the shared domain
between companies and consumers, or the prevention of the growth of such libraries
altogether. The consumer is given a unique veto power over another's ability to learn
about him or her, a power that cannot be granted without diminishing the freedom of
others. Because we do not own information about ourselves as a general rule, this veto
power represents a drastic upheaval in the normal rules of human society. Like a
sudden broadening of privacy torts, copyright law, or trademark law, most proposed
regulation shrinks the public domain. This conflict is seen between the expansion of
copyright law or trademark law and free speech, but privacy law does not have the
constitutional sanction that intellectual property law does.
Id. at 120-21.
151. See Winer, supra note 70 (noting that unnecessary regulation distorts the developing
electronic marketplace and raises overall price levels for consumers and that false information in
the market almost always causes adverse effects on consumers).
152. Numerous laws regulate information flow, but many of those laws require disclosure
'and the further dissemination of information rather than the quashing of it. See Cate, supra note
7, at 882 & n.26 (providing securities laws, banking laws, and insurance laws, inter alia, as
examples of law and regulations that favor the free flow of information). Further, many
academics believe that disclosure regulations are constitutional but that other restrictions
regarding collection might violate the First Amendment. See Brown, supra note 140.
154. See Rose, supra note 41, at 446-48 (discussing the industry's sectoral approach to
privacy regulation, and why this method of private individuals working with consumer groups is
preferred to broad government regulation)
154. Bensoussan, supra note 12, at 299.
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regulation in the U.S would invade the private sphere by preventing
individuals from learning about each other, because the thrust of such
legislation would regulate business entities rather than curtailing
government influence. In contrast, individuals should be free to learn
about each other in the marketplace, because, as Posner notes, this
knowledge encourages accountability and helps to prevent
promulgation of false information.155
C. Regulation of the Private Sphere Versus Constraintson Government
While some concern exists regarding business encroachment on
individual privacy, most Americans view the government as a greater
15 7
threat 156 to individual liberty than other individuals or companies.
In addition, the Constitution does not explicitly grant individuals a
right to privacy, but the Supreme Court has interpreted certain
provisions of the Constitution to provide some protection from
government encroachment on individual privacy.'5 8 As a result, many
Americans prefer decentralized authority and remain apprehensive
about regulation of the private sphere. 59 Even when countries pass
statutes regulating privacy, this regulation typically restrains the
government, not private actors.1 60 Without a compelling governmental
156. Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L.REV. 393, 399 (1978) (noting the
importance of encouraging accountability).
156. See Cate, supra note 8, at 220 (noting that the government, not individuals, presents
the largest threat to individual liberty, which explains why many constitutional rights protect
against government action).
157. See Cate, supra note 7, at 884-86 (noting that the Constitution typically monitors state
action, not the individual sphere):
One dominant theme of constitutional rights is the protection of citizens from
government intrusion into their privacy. A vigorous First Amendment, for example,
permits individuals the privacy of their own thoughts, beliefs, and associations. The
Third Amendment keeps government soldiers from being quartered in private homes.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth
Amendment restricts government from interfering with private property, provides for
due process and compensation when it does so, and protects citizens from selfincrimination. Collectively, these and other provisions of the Constitution impose
extraordinary limits on government authority to intrude on private property, compel
testimony, or interfere with practices closely related to individual beliefs, such as
protest, marriage, family planning, or worship.
Id. at 884-85.
158. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 52 (1997); see also id. at 49-66
(providing a detailed discussion of the constitutional limits on government encroachment into the
private sphere).
159. See Wellberry, supra note 117 (noting that the U.S. adopts a decentralized wait-and-see
approach and that individuals in the U.S. usually worry about excess government power and
intrusion into privacy rather than excess power vested in private individuals).
160. See, e.g., Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy:
(What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 26 (discussing the Privacy Act of 1974 and
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interest, courts typically prefer the free flow of information over such
broad regulation.
D. Can More Government Control Really Be the Answer?
The guiding principle of U.S. privacy norms lies in a less-is1 1
more approach to government regulation of personal information.
Americans rarely favor broad legislation, and view governmental
162
control over personal information as contrary to American values.
In contrast, the Directive requires each member state to create a
national supervisory authority, known as a data authority, 16 3 to
control personal data that companies seek to process. 164 The Directive
requires companies to secure documented consent from individuals
and present this information to the data authority before they can use
the collected information. 165 In practice, the government authority
(data authority) retains the information in its databases, and the
individual actually loses control of her information to the
government. 66 This loss of control effectively gives the government
control over personal information, which contravenes traditional U.S.
privacy norms and policies, thus creating further tension between the
Directive and the traditional U.S. approach.
The EU's creation of data authorities actually gives the
government more power over individuals' information. 16 7 Under the
noting that at that time, the country worried about "Big Brother," because the government
wanted to compile a database which would serve as a centralized repository of records of U.S.
citizens). As a result, Congress held hearings culminating in the enactment of the 1974 Privacy
Act, which applied to the government and its collection practices. Id. It limited the extent to
which the government could intrude into the private lives of its citizens. Id. The 1974 Act was a
landmark accord for privacy legislation, but its breadth was limited to constraining the
government as it set limits for collection, use, dissemination of personal information held or
collected by government agencies. Id.
161. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text. The data authority acts as a surrogate
of the government. Julia Gladstone, The Impact of E-Commerce on the Laws of Nations Article:
The U.S. Privacy Balance and the European Privacy Directive: Reflections on the United States
PrivacyPolicy, 7 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIsp. RESOL. 10, 22 (2000).
164. See infranotes 169-170 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
166. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. The practical result is counterintuitivewhile advocates want to protect privacy, they basically lose the right to any anonymity-if each
company or person must get affirmative consent from each individual, this "consent" must be
secured and verified somewhere and stored in a repository for documentation. See Johnson,
supra note 10, at 22. This creates tension, because the information actually remains stored with
the government. Id.
167. In theory, every business must get affirmative consent from each individual prior to
collecting personally identifiable information from her. The company then must verify this
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infrastructure established by the EU Directive, the government,
through the data authorities, stores personal data. 168 Under this
system, the data authority therefore acts as a surrogate for the EU,
because the Directive requires that each member state create an
independent public authority that supervises data flows, retains
investigative power over data processing, and retains the ability to
access the data. 16 9 The system aims to create uniformity, but the
Directive in fact grants the government the power to store the
information. This transfer of power would create a problematic
situation in the U.S., because the EU method of registering data
processing activities does not align with American values of minimal
government intrusion into the private sphere.1 70 Because the Directive
requires that companies or persons who wish to "collect, process, use,
store, and disseminate personal information" register with a
government entity, the Directive contravenes the U.S. constitutional
171
framework.
72
Member states' differing laws only exacerbate the problem.
EU countries remain free to establish varying levels of privacy. For
example, Italy's provisions are stricter than those provided in the
Directive.1 73 Italian laws state that individuals must give consent in
writing, but "such processing must be specially authorized by the

consent with its local data authority. This information/documentation of consent must be stored
in databases somewhere, since it is stored with the data authority, a public authority, the
individual loses her right to anonymity on-line. Id.
168. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
169. Cate describes the contours of the EU framework:
Each member state must establish an independent public authority to supervise
the protection of personal data. Each 'supervisory authority' must have, at minimum,
the power to investigate data processing activities, including a right of access to the
underlying data, as well as the power to intervene to order the erasure of data and the
cessation of processing, and to block the proposed transfer of data to third parties.
Cate, supra note 8, at 183. Ultimately, this gives a substantial amount of power to a delegated
authority of the government. See id. at 183-84 nn.56-57.
170. See Rose, supra note 41, at 469-70 (noting that self-regulation intrudes less into
individuals' lives than mandating that companies that collect information notify the
government).
171. See Cate, supra note 8, at 226 (noting that the EU scheme is antithetical to the U.S.
constitutional scheme for privacy, because the freedom of expression and freedom from
government intervention trumps the government's right to intrude into individuals' lives).
172. See Cate, supra note 8, at 195. But see id. (noting that although the U.K. law is much
more detailed, it really does not affect what level of privacy is afforded-it does, however, leave
less to a national authority with regard to discretion on data collection); id. at 230 (arguing that
direct government oversight does not provide proper privacy protection). These different laws are
discussed more fully in Part VI.
173. Id. at 194-95.
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national government's supervisory authority." 174 This scenario results
in uncertainty in the law-even more so when different member states
enact varying levels of protection. 17 In sum, many privacy advocates
push for broad legislation under the guise of civil liberties without
acknowledging a long-standing U.S. maxim: Strong distrust of a
centralized government with unfettered discretion over personal
privacy counsels against vesting greater authority to regulate on-line
privacy in a centralized government body. 176 Implementing an EUstyle regulation in the U.S. poses a difficult challenge under First
Amendment principles. 177 In addition to these problems, a closer look
at the Directive and the infrastructure that it supports reveals that
the Directive fails to achieve its articulated goal of uniformity in the
178
regulatory framework.
VI. THE EU DIRECTIVE AND THE STATED GOAL OF UNIFORMITY

The Directive does not achieve the goal of uniformity for two
reasons. First, the standards 179 vary among member states. Second,
deference to the interpretations of multiple, member state-specific
data authorities erodes uniformity. These two issues work in tandem
to cause the Directive to fail in its stated goal of uniformity in the
regulatory frameworks of EU member states. A similar system here in
the U.S. would also likely fail in the same regard.

174. Id.; see also Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 736 (noting that the Directive gives national
supervisory authorities (independent agencies) significant interpretive power).
175. See Bloss, supra note 42, at 650-51 (contending that EU citizens trust administrative
bodies more than Americans trust them).
176. Cate, supra note 8, at 226, n.330 (quoting Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection
and the FirstAmendment: Why a "PressExemption" Won't Work, 80 IOWA L. REV. 639, 64849 (1993)).
Privacy advocates urge the adoption of the European model for data protection in the
name of protecting civil liberties. But in so doing, they ignore, or repudiate, an
important aspect of the American democratic tradition: distrust of powerful central
government .... [When it comes to privacy, Americans generally do not assume that
the government necessarily has citizens' best interests at heart .... The European
paradigm assumes a much higher comfort level with a far more authoritarian
government.
Id.
177. Id. at 226 (noting that persons who collect information must then register the data with
a national supervisory authority, and so control is placed with the government, not the
individual).
178. Generally, uniformity aids in providing predictability, ease of enforcement, and
congruity in the law.
179. In particular, the "adequacy" standard can vary significantly between member states.
Shimanek, supra note 57, at 464-65.
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The Directive seeks to provide uniformity in data practices
throughout the EU. 80° This goal is similar to the U.S. federal system,
in which there exists an overarching goal to create and maintain
predictability and uniformity among various state bodies of law.
Uniformity allows individuals and companies to rely on existing laws
and not be concerned with varying standards in different states or
countries. However, the Directive fails to provide uniformity along
these lines.
Implementation of an EU-style regulation in the U.S. is
unlikely to fulfill the desire for uniformity: much like the emperor's
weavers touted their magical cloth, the EU praises the Directive's
"uniformity," even though the Directive is not uniform. Many U.S.
privacy advocates "see" this new set of clothes, so to speak, but refuse
to acknowledge its shortcomings, such as the lack of uniformity. The
fundamental problem lies in the fact that the Directive allows for
individual member states to enact their own privacy laws, so long as
these laws do not provide less than Directive's threshold
protections.1 8 ' Under the Directive, member states provide the actual
substantive law for data transfer, not the EU. 8 2 On its face, this
requirement does not appear to pose an insurmountable problem, but
a closer analysis reveals the Directive's failure to provide for any real
uniformity. 8 3 Because each member state applies its own substantive
law, different member states create varying data protection levels.
This variation creates a dilemma, because the system results in
agencies that operate independent of one another, which gives power
back to the government by giving these authorities a "degree of
interpretive power over any individual case."'8 4 Since the Directive
affords them this broad interpretive power, it follows that their own
legal traditions will taint their adjudications. This discretion allows
agencies to inject member state law as well as national norms and

180. Bauchner, supra note 18, at 690 (noting the articulated goal of uniformity).
181. See Shimanek, supra note 57, at 464-65 (noting that a single member state can choose
to implement stricter policies than the EU Directive itself, which creates a situation in which a
single member state can effectively trump or veto other countries' laws); see Gladstone, supra
note 163, at 18 (discussing the lack of uniformity in the EU, because each member state must
pass its own legislation).
182. See Gladstone, supra note 163, at 18.
183. See Bauchner, supra note 18, at 690, 704-05 (noting that the articulated goal of
uniformity is not the likely outcome).
184. Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 736 ("While a European level decision is supposed to
apply in each Member State, the national supervisory authorities are independent agencies and
will still have a degree of interpretive power over any individual case.").

970

VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:939

interpretations into the mix rather than interpreting the Directive
85
itself.1
For example, France and Germany require higher and stricter
levels than Italy requires.18 6 The Directive provides that no country
may enact laws lower than the EU threshold, but it allows member
states, at their discretion, to enact laws much stricter than the
underlying EU rule of "adequacy." 18 7 This flexibility causes the EU to
fall short of its intended goal of uniformity; indeed, the local laws of
the member states display everything but uniformity-thus
dismantling the facade that the Directive creates.18 8
As a result of this variation, companies operating in more than
one EU member state must follow the strictest country's law, not the
EU's law.18 9 This instability defeats the purpose of a "uniform"
system. 190 As the level of uniformity decreases, so does the law's
predictability. While many argue that the Directive's uniformity is its
185. Angela R. Broughton et al., International Employment, 33 INT'L LAW. 291, 296 (1998);
Cate, supra note 8, at 192-96 (providing an excellent discussion of various member states' laws,
ranging from Italy to Sweden to Portugal and discussing nuances in the laws implemented by
these countries).
186. See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 5 n.10 (noting that France and Germany also demand a
higher threshold than other countries such as Italy). For case studies regarding the differing
privacy practices in these respective countries, see id.; see also infra note 188 and accompanying
text.
187. See Directive, supra note 1, at 25(1) (noting that each member state must provide
adequate protection). However, the Directive provides little guidance as to what constitutes
adequate. The final arbiter interprets subjective terms such as adequate. A major problem exists
not only with ascertaining the meaning of adequate, but also with the fact that member states
may adopt stricter standards should they choose to do so. See Winer, supra note 63
(acknowledging the problem of differing standards). Further, different privacy standards often
end up in the dustbin because they are either unenforceable or ignored. Thus, these standards
can actually destroy privacy because they are neither consistent nor predictable. Id.; see also
Bauchner, supra note 18, at 704 n.100 (stating that states are given the right to implement even
stricter rules if they wish); James A. Harvey & Kimberly A. Verska, U.S. Firms Weigh Their
Options on EU DataPrivacy Obligations, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Apr. 2001, at 17 (stating
that countries such as Spain and Portugal enact very strict regulations and impose heavy fines,
while other countries utilize less strict guidelines). See generally Directive Article 5.
188. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 21-22 (comparing Sweden's laws with other member
states' laws).
189. The country that decides that it wants the strictest rules for data privacy wins, while
the U.S. (or any other "third" country) must comply with her rules/regulations in order to do
business in that country. Ultimately, it erodes the concept of uniformity that U.S. privacy
advocates have come to cherish-as well as one of the fundamental tenets of the Directive.
190. See infra notes 199, 202 and accompanying text. Lack of uniformity invites lax
enforcement and leads to endless litigation. Lack of enforcement then naturally leads to
complacence in the implementation of the principles. The principle of uniformity thus defeats
itself. However, one argument is that this system really creates uniformity to the strictest
principles, rather than eroding uniformity. This argument lacks persuasive value, however, as it
creates a slippery slope such that no, or very little, information can be transferred if countries
can trump each other repeatedly when enacting laws to comply with the Directive.
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greatest virtue, it may, in fact, be its weakest element. One scholar
even noted, "[t]his is a far cry from the uniform data protection
standards anticipated by the Directive's proponents."' 91
The EU Directive inevitably facilitates nonuniformity by virtue
of its infrastructure as described above. This nonuniformity results
because, as a practical matter, if a business wants to engage in on-line
trade within any EU member state, the business must comply with
that member state's data privacy rules, regardless of whether that
state imposes stricter rules than other member states or than the
Directive itself.192 Under this system, one member state can effectively
trump the laws of the other member states and consequently force
other member states to raise data standards to the strictest level. 193
Delegating to member states a quasi-veto power over the laws of
another member state creates friction between the member states
because any member state could hypothetically raise the bar to an
arbitrary level. 194 Thus, the degree of data protection a country is able
to invoke is limitless.' 95 In the event that other member states do not
raise the bar to this level, nonuniformity results, and the stated
96
purpose of the Directive is undermined.'
Sweden serves as an example of a country that fosters such
nonuniformity. Swedish national law makes it illegal to mention
information about any identifiable individual on the Internet without
prior permission.' 97 Clearly, this is a stricter standard than other
member states impose. The application of this law led to inconsistent

191. Cate, supra note 8, at 195.
192. See Shimanek, supra note 57, at 465 n.79 (noting that each member state decides on its
own what is considered adequate, that the result ultimately turns on how strict the member
states, as individual entities, decide they want their laws and regulations to be, and that the
functional effect is that a single member state can have a veto power); see id. at 465 (noting that
if one member state actually enforces their laws strictly, the U.S. could suffer a huge setback).
Another example of nonuniformity hides in the nomenclature itself: data collected from
"identifiable persons" is subject to the Directive's hand, yet the term "identifiable person" is not
uniform across the member states. Reidenberg, supra note 22, at 785; see id. at 785 n.67 (noting
that the Directive does not solve all of the ambiguity and divergence).
193. Bauchner, supra note 18, at 704-05 n.104 ("Since each Member State is responsible for
determining a third country's adequacy, such unavoidable 'disparities' in regulations among
Member States means the adequacy requirement could be raised to meet the highest bar
established by any single Member State."); see supra note 192 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 192-193; see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
195. Bauchner, supra note 18, at 705.
196. See, e.g., Judy & Hayes, supra note 35 (noting that a significant problem is that some
member states use the Directive as a model for their own laws, instead of following the Directive
strictly and that some member states do not even have their own privacy laws).
197. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that Sweden was implementing the Directive
via their own national law).
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results across the EU. 198 When the Swedish government arrested fur
protesters, after they advertised a boycott of certain fur producers and
identified those fur producers by name, conflict resulted. This variance
occurred because identifying fur protesters by name is not problematic
in other member states. 199 While it is debatable whether mentioning
fur producers by name raises any real privacy concerns, the practical
result is that, under the Directive, other countries must conform their
data practices with Sweden's regulatory framework. This requirement
either will create a situation of maximum privacy or it will erode
uniformity, but neither outcome represents an optimal solution. With
respect to this particular issue, Sweden holds the proverbial "queen of
hearts" in that it can effectively force, or at least exert substantial
pressure upon the other member states, to increase the level of
regulation. The EU institutes these policies at the risk of arbitrary
lawmaking, which destroys rather than facilitates uniformity, because
"small divergences and ambiguities will inevitably exist where the
principles must be interpreted by different supervisory agencies in
each of the member states. These remaining divergences in standards
can pose significant obstacles for the complex information processing
arrangements that are typical in electronic commerce."2 00 Even the EU
officials have even stated that the Directive is "ill suited to a far flung,
20 1
inherently global medium such as the Internet."
According to this analysis, the Directive creates a recipe for
arbitrariness and may erode the stated goal of uniformity in on-line
privacy regulations among EU member states. Again, the practical
20 2
effect of this procedural framework is the erosion of uniformity.
198. See id.
199. Id. Certain member states maintain national law at a macrolevel and national laws
that deal with specialized topics in privacy (and other countries do not) which exacerbates the
problem. Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor:European Data ProtectionLaw and Electronic
Commerce, 35 INT'L LAW. 79, 81 n.10 (2001) (advancing the proposition that the Directive
ultimately lacks uniformity and providing a discussion of countries like Germany which have
special laws for certain topics such as the Teleservices Data Protection Act, which can be found
(in
German)
at www.eed.de.iukdg/gesetz/iukdg.html).
Member
states
also
write
recommendations and pronouncements, which are like dicta in Supreme Court opinions, because
while they are not law, they are persuasive in practice. Id. at 81 n.10-11. Not all of the member
states have laws that are this strict on a particular or specialized topic of privacy law.
200. Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 734 (noting the difference in scope of the term
"identifiable person" distorts companies' ability to process information).
201. Cate, supra note 8, at 230.
202. See Broughton et al., supra note 185, at 297.
[F]rom the point of view of individuals and private employer companies, the directive
has no teeth until a member state implements it. And the member states have
latitude to implement the directive in varying ways-so that ultimately, for example,
France's data privacy law (and the bureaucracy set up under it) will likely look
significantly different from, say, Germany's.
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Even if lawmakers overcome this problem and achieve uniformity,
serious implications still exist if member states do not enforce their
regulations or enforce them to differing degrees. As a result, U.S.
principles, unless all of
companies likely will not adopt the Directive's
20 3
well.
as
them
adopt
the member states
VII. THE EU DIRECTIVE LACKS ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS

While creating stringent regulations for data collection and
20 4
dissemination, the Directive lacks a coherent enforcement structure.
Without effective enforcement mechanisms, the substantive law of online privacy regulation lacks practical applicability and fails to protect
the public in any meaningful way. Without enforcement mechanisms,
the law also provides little incentive for companies to adhere to its
dictates. 20 5 While the EU created broad regulations and legislation, it
does not enforce its provisions in the way that privacy advocates are
led to believe. 20 6 In some cases, member states either do not enforce
their national laws or enforce them to varying degrees. 20 7 In certain
instances, member states do not enforce their national laws for
business reasons; in other situations, the member states do not yet
have an infrastructure to enforce the Directive or even have existing
national law. 208

Id.
203. See Harvey & Verska, supra note 187, at 18.
204. See O'Brien, supra note 4, at 89 (noting that complete nondisclosure of information is
never necessary, not desirable, and virtually impossible to enforce).
205. See Harvey & Verska, supra note 187, at 18-19. Several EU states do not maintain
substantial and extensive privacy policies and even where there is legislation, little enforcement
exists. See id. at 19. Some countries, such as Spain and Portugal, invoke strict regulations and
impose heavy fines, while other countries like the UK and France impose very few sanctions. See
id. Winer offers a cynical view: "Or, as they say on Mars, where the EU has talked the talk, the
U.S. has walked the walk. Lawyers who practice commercial law involving international
business see this every day." Winer, supra note 76.
206. See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 26, at 5 (pointing out that critics argue that member states
do not comply fully with the registration obligations).
207. See infra note 213; see also Harvey & Verska, supra note 187, at 18 (noting a lack of
compliance in the EU itself-few EU websites provide the required notices regarding disclosure
and use of personal data). A dearth of hard evidence exists from EU reports or industry reports
that a vast number of European companies are rushing to ensure wide-scale compliance projects.
Until the EU companies start to adopt their own principles in their entirety, it is unlikely that
U.S. companies likely will move up to a higher threshold of data privacy. See id. Several EU
states have not adopted legislation, and even where legislation exists, little enforcement occurs.
Id. For example, the U.K. and France received numerous complaints about data abuse, but few
result in sanctions or even investigations. Id. at 19.
208. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
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This lack of enforcement begs the questionof why U.S. privacy
advocates encourage the adoption of similar provisions. 20 9 Moreover,
U.S. companies view the lack of enforcement in Europe as a
disincentive to conform to the EU Directive. As one scholar has noted,
"[t]he lack of resources for government enforcement, especially when
confronted with such widespread data processing, further diminishes
the likely role of the [D]irective as an effective means of protecting
privacy on-line." 2 10 This lack of enforcement in the EU makes the
Directive an ineffective solution to privacy concerns in the EU, and,
2 11
more importantly, in the U.S.
This deficient enforcement mechanism weakens the ability of
the European Union to regulate companies outside of Europe, because
"[u]ntil it gets its own house in order, the EU would have a tough time
21 2
trying to enforce the Directive against companies overseas."
Further, while more of the member states enact legislation in
compliance with the Directive, neither the level of implementation nor
the enforcement 2 13 is completely effective. As a result, U.S. companies
halted their sudden rush to comply with the Directive, because they
214
became aware of the significant enforcement problems in the EU.
Many possible reasons exist to explain the Directive's lack of
enforcement. One possibility is that in the EU, "there are
disincentives to litigation. If a plaintiff files and loses, the plaintiff
generally pays the costs for both sides."2 15 This actually creates a
disincentive for private individuals to bring claims. However,
209. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
210. Cate, supra note 8, at 230-31.
211. If countries in the EU that adhere to the Directive do not enforce their own regulations
either because they lack the infrastructure or because they simply choose not to enforce it, little
incentive exists for a U.S. (or a third country) business to achieve a higher threshold of data
protection. See Kuner, supra note 199, at 82-83 (noting that national or local authorities at the
member state level lack resources and personnel to engage in widespread enforcement and that
it is also difficult to monitor compliance because of Internet traffic).
212. Loomis, supra note 26, at 5 (quoting John T. Bentivoglio, of counsel at the law firm of
Arnold & Porter, discussing the EU Internet privacy Directive).
213. See Reidenberg, supra note 41, at 734-35. As Internet law scholar Joel Reidenberg
noted,
Compliance with the national laws has also been an issue in Europe. The notice and
registration requirements, in particular, appear to have a spotty reception. One study
conducted for the European Commission questioned whether data processors were
adequately notifying their treatment of personal information to the national
supervisory authorities, and a recent study by Consumers International found that
European Web sites were not routinely informing web users of their use of personal
information.
Id.
214. Loomis, supra note 26, at 5 (acknowledging that the lack of enforcement removes any
sense of urgency for U.S. firms to comply).
215. Winer, supra note 70.
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regardless of the reasons, the EU does not effectively enforce the
216
Directive.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The EU Directive represents an on-line privacy system that
clashes directly with the U.S. data privacy infrastructure. Like the
public who could clearly see the emperor's nakedness but who
pretended not to, many U.S. privacy advocates push for a similar
system in this country. A piece of legislation similar to the Directive
will not work in the U.S. because of the potential First Amendment
violations. Simply put, legislation similar to the Directive contradicts
traditional American privacy values and interferes with the
touchstone of First Amendment principles-the free flow of
information. Further, the Directive does not achieve its articulated
goals of uniformity and the protection of fundamental rights. Instead,
its procedural framework erodes uniformity.
The Directive's weavers, while claiming that they possess a
cure-all for privacy concerns, advocate the implementation of a similar
system in the U.S. The Directive, however, is a facade-an
unfortunate truth that privacy advocates refuse to recognize. The
emperor paraded through the town wearing nothing, yet the crowd
looked beyond the emperor's folly and praised his "new clothes."
Likewise, privacy advocates appear naked without their clothes,
because they adamantly encourage identical legislation in the U.S.
that cannot function.

216. Interview with Steven Hetcher, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law
School, in Nashville, Tennessee (Dec. 23, 2002). A substantial real-world difference between the
U.S. and the EU is that a similar legislative action in the U.S. would invite massive amounts of
class action litigation. Id. Currently, in the EU, the Directive has not produced such a result. Id.
However, for U.S. companies, this risk of class action litigation remains, arguably, the biggest
fear of all. Id. If Congress passes a broad piece of legislation, every individual could, and likely
would, sue. Id. Legislation like the Directive would therefore obviously cause catastrophic
problems in the U.S. Id.
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The children, however, unmoved by public sentiment,
recognized the truth and spoke their mind. Likewise, opponents
recognize the shortcomings of broad, EU-style privacy legislation and
therefore seek to tear down the facade for the sake of finding a real,
workable privacy solution.
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